







infrastructures strengthened through the Togo Rural Development Support Project (PADAT), to improve integration across the targeted value chains.

For cotton, the project would support institutional strengthening of the producers' organization (Togo Federation of Cotton Producers' Groups-FNGPC), in order to enable it to take full responsibility for input distribution to farmers, to improve quality of seed cotton and to participate effectively in the governance of the cotton company (New Togo Cotton Company- NSCT), as a strategic shareholder. The project would also finance a study for preparing the entry of a private partner in the capital of the cotton company and for the creation of the cotton inter-professional board. For coffee and cocoa, the project would support gradual regeneration of the existing plantations (and some extensions in favorable zones) through (i) provision of adapted technical advisory



This component aimed to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Water Resources (MAEP) to coordinate the implementation of this Bank financed project efficiently and manage other National Agriculture and Food and Nutrition Security Investment Program (PNIASA) investments, while preparing the transition to a Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) in the future. It included the following three sub-components:

The project would support the implementation of MAEP reform including the restructuring of MAEP and its subsidiary agencies at central and regional/local levels, the introduction of a results-based management and accountability system (RBMAS), the strengthening of fiduciary management capacities in all MAEP structures, and the modernization of MAEP infrastructures and equipment. MAEP restructuring would result in a new MAEP organigram that would be endorsed by the Cabinet. The RBMAS would be introduced as part of the restructuring targets. MAEP structures (directorates at central level, regional structures and specialized agencies) would be subject to performance agreements agreed and monitored by the General Secretariat. The General Secretary would also sign and monitor the implementation of service delivery contracts with private partners. Specifically, the Project would finance: (i) methodological support (e.g. studies, manuals) and tools (e.g. software) for the implementation of the MAEP reform (including the RBMAS), and of the fiduciary management and M&E systems; (ii) the accompanying training plan of MAEP staff, to ensure effective capacity building; (iii) critical managerial or technical studies to accompany sector policy reform, and their public dissemination, and (iv) the modernization of MAEP's infrastructures, equipment and work environ1(pmer public 7rk envimi)-1(suuds-1(f)1 )1pctcity -buil oto auprivatsector



Component 1 had five new activities added: (i) the consolidation of existing 20 ESOPs (Entreprises de Services et Organisations Paysannes) developed under the original project with the construction of small infrastructure (warehouses and drying areas); (ii) the provision of equipment to improve the quality of processed products, capacity building for better management, marketing of final products, and increased profitability; (iii) the provision of technical assistance to beneficiaries of sub projects to improve profitability of their businesses; (iv) the selection of new beneficiaries under the competitive and matching grant scheme; (v) the transformation of successful sub projects into small or medium enterprises with a specialized service provider and facilitating access to finance. Further assistance was given to the recently created coffee and cocoa inter-profession. The project promoted, in collaboration with WAAPP, the dissemination of improved technologies for fish farming.

Component 2 was complemented with support for processing, quality improvement and increased access to markets for animal products through the establishment of small-scale culling areas in key livestock rearing regions in the country as well as through the building of a city building of fughyning fofee and 5 of 24













24,800 ha of water areas were covered by new management plans adopted by fishermen themselves and 206 fish farms were either established or upgraded as a result of project support, against a target of 186 fish farms (target exceeded).

The project supported 60 sub-projects on aquaculture and fisheries under the matching grant scheme.

3,800 and 2,500 improved housing units for poultry and small ruminants were constructed on farms (ICR, paragraph 24).

13,244 small livestock producers adopted improved animal husbandry practices, against the end project target of 13,000 (target exceeded).

3,679 improved genitors (male biological lines) for small ruminants and 5,300 improved poultry genitors were sourced from the Togolese institute of agricultural research and private breeders and distributed to livestock producers (ICR, paragraph 24).

7,479 livestock producers were using improved breeds and 13,244 were using improved animal husbandry practices as results of project support (ICR, paragraph 24).

16.8 million chickens were vaccinated and treated for parasites, while 3.8 million small ruminants were also treated for sheep and goat plague (PPR) and other afflictions to improve animal health and



The project provided support in five main areas: (i) the development and implementation of fisheries management plans for the main national lakes and rivers; (ii) training of fishermen; (iii) technical capacity building of civil servants in charge of fisheries advisory support; (iv) access to fish feed and fingerlings, promotion of fish processing (especially among women), and improving market access for fish farmers and fishermen; (v) the production of highly productive fingerlings by the project which rehabilitated the national aquaculture research and fingerling rearing center; and (vi) assisted private fish hatcheries. As a result of these activities, annual fish production increased from 600 tons (baseline) to 18,058 tons, significantly exceeding the PDO target of 7,500 tons by 240%.

The project supported the livestock sector through improving breeds, construction of improved housing for poultry and small ruminant, financing country-wide vaccination campaigns, and supporting commercial poultry and small ruminants farms through matching grants. These activities increased livestock numbers for small ruminants from a baseline of 40,000 to 105,218 head or 120% of the end-project target of 87,000 heads, and increased poultry numbers from a baseline of 60,000 to 394,240 or 157% of the project end target of 250,000. Also, the number of animals marketed by commercial farms increased to 109,211 heads of small ruminants and 748,415 of chickens exceeding the project end-targets of 14,100 and 530,000, respectively, no baseline data were provided by the ICR. The project also supported processing, quality improvements of livestock marketed as reflected in higher prices received and increased access to markets for animal products by increasing livestock marketing points in village and regional markets, which resulted in the improvements of food safety standards and quality and a better hygiene for the meat sold in domestic markets. However, the ICR did not explain how these parameters were assessed.

In a further communication, the Bank project team explained to IEG that: "the reported improvements were based on verbal reports of users during monitoring visits of the ministry staff. This was not based on a formal survey or quantitative assessment. The government planned to conduct a formal assessment of these parameters in the coming months."

The above-mentioned assessment provides considerable evidence that the project was successful in "rehabilitating and reinforcing productive capacities among targeted beneficiaries across selected value chains in the recipient's territory". The project also met or exceeded all its output and outcome targets. The recorded results were attributable to the project activities as the project was the sole source of financing for agricultural development for the targeted beneficiaries (ICR paragraph 24).

Therefore, the efficacy with which Objective 1 was achieved is rated Substantial.

Substantial

PDO#2: To foster an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector, in the Recipient's territory.



An enabling institutional environment for agricultural sector development would emerge through support to reforms and capacity building for producers and their organizations, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries (MAF) and its 61 districts and Ff 120 g-1 14 infrae, uc990e.or chi1 I(r



Project (TRDPSP) and the West African Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP). The strengthened capacity, improved infrastructure, reforms and better sector coordination, enabled the Ministry to implement 78% of its National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Program (PNIASA) budget against a target of 75%. The ICR (paragraph 24) explained that achieving this result was significant because it happened without the continued technical assistance by an outside consultant to support the management of the process. The project delivered 379 grants to beneficiaries and the project reached 282,921 direct beneficiaries, against an end target of 200,000 beneficiaries (target exceeded).

While the Results Framework lacked any direct indicators to assess objective 2, the evidence provided and the proxy indicator used (rate of budget execution of the National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Program) makes it plausible to conclude that the project was highly successful in fostering "an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector in the recipient's territory." However, it is unknown whether this enabling institutional environment would be sustainable post project completion since it is only an achievement if sustained.

Therefore, and based on the above-mentioned assessment, the efficacy with which Objective 2 was achieved is rated Substantial.

Substantial











However, as the ICR noted, sustainability of this outcome could potentially be undermined if: (i) There is a failure to maintain infrastructure and equipment acquired under the project, (ii) The Business Services and Producer Organizations (ESOPs) fail to attract the participation of producers and the private sector in the enterprise ownership. Also, some ESOPs could face difficulties in securing enough funds to purchase the required quantities of raw materials and cover their operating costs; and (iii) The warehouse receipt system fails as this would hinder marketing of production. The sustainability of the receipt system hinges around finding strong financial institutions willing to lend to the warehouse owners.

The ICR (paragraph 61) rated this risk as moderate based on the cross cutting support provided by the project to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. The challenge for the Ministry will be to maintain or improve on its performance levels that were achieved through the project's support. A critical factor to sustain performance going forward is the allocation of adequate budget to the agriculture sector and meet the CAADP commitment of 10% of the national budget. This would help maintain the performance achieved at project closing.

These factors are beyond the control of the project and could negatively impact the sustainability of both of the project's main outcomes. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic could over-stretch the government resources and result in a reduction of budget funds allocated to agriculture. Also, natural disasters (such as pest outbreaks and floods) could negatively impact productivity. Finally, a fall in demand would result in excess supply and depressed prices. This situation could force farmers to reduce their focus on some crops or livestock enterprises and seek other sources of off-farm income.

The Bank was requested by the GoT to take the lead and help mobilize donor agencies, align and harmonize their interventions, and strengthen capacities of rural institutions to achieve PNIASA implementation (PAD, paragraph 9). The project objectives were in line with the country priorities and the Bank's strategies (see section 3 for more details). To prepare the project, "the Bank set up the team with the required expertise and enough specialists with extensive experience in the agricultural sector (ICR, paragraph 36)." The project design reflected complementarity with other projects implemented in the country, namely, Togo Rural Development Support Project (TRDSP), and West African Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP). Design reflected lessons learned from past Bank and non-Bank projects in Togo (including the ongoing Community Development Project) and value chain development projects in neighboring countries. These lessons related to: (i) successful value chain development required a market-oriented and private sector-led approach; (ii) technology adoption hinges on the availability of inputs, access to adequate agricultural finance and advisory services; (iii) selectivity of actions and commodity choices deriving from the most promising economic perspectives outlined in the Sources of Growth Study – Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) undertaken in FY09.





The ICR (paragraph 68) described the Bank Supervision team support as “remarkable, driven by the need to foster team spirit, knowledge sharing, and the desire of the project team to showcase their results and improve performance.” The team’s close monitoring of implementation enabled the project to overcome delays and reach a 99% disbursement rate by project completion.

Quality of supervision is rated Satisfactory.

Overall Bank performance is rated Satisfactory.

Satisfactory

Satisfactory

The PAD did not include a Theory of Change (ToC) as it was not required at appraisal. Nonetheless, the ICR (page 6) included one that clearly showed the links between the project inputs, outputs, outcomes and longer-term impacts. The ToC in the ICR also included the key assumptions that underpinned the achievement of the stated objectives. The PDO was to be assessed through the following four outcome - level indicators: (i) Farm output subject to project supported post-harvest value-adding schemes (rice, corn); (ii) Increase of crop (coffee, cocoa) and continental fisheries output, and of livestock population (small ruminants, poultry) among project beneficiaries; (iii) Rates of PNIASA financial execution (for ASSP, PADAT and WAAPP altogether), and (iv) number of direct beneficiaries of which 20% are women. The first two indicators related to PDO#1 (rehabilitate and reinforce productive capacities among targeted beneficiaries across selected value chains). These were clear, measurable with reasonable targets and directly linked to the stated PDO. However, only the second indicator had baseline data. The third indicator was a proxy to assess the achievement of PDO#2 (foster an enabling institutional environment for the development of the agricultural sector, in the recipient’s territory). While the indicator was measurable and easy to track, it did not provide a comprehensive assessment of the stated PDO. Finally, the fourth indicator was a count of the project beneficiaries against an appraisal target.

The Results Framework (RF) included eleven intermediate outcome indicators to track the different activities supported by the project. Most of these indicators were quantitative and linked to the stated activities. Overall, the RF was consistent with the project’s ToC and included adequate indicators to monitor implementation progress as well as the progress toward the achievement of the project outcomes. Also, according to the ICR (paragraph 47) M&E design benefited from a well-thought-out M&E operations manual that clearly defined all key concepts and variables, including who was eligible to be counted as a beneficiary.



The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Water Resources' institutional structures conducted the project's M&E activities. According to the ICR (paragraph 48), the M&E system benefited from the project team's close attention and from deploying adequate human and financial resources to it. Implementation support missions discussed and vetted all reports on project implementation and achievements to ensure that reliable data were provided. Also, Bank field visits verified the reported progress through spot checks and verification. M&E activities included technical discussions and joint field missions with other PNIASA partners (IFAD, FAO, German Cooperation). This allowed the triangulation and vetting of the results reported by the project team. Also, the client closing evaluation reported final outcome figures, verification methodology, links to country reporting, and a beneficiary survey. According to the ICR (paragraph 48) the results reported in the final evaluation "were fully in line with reporting throughout the life of the project." An assessment of the beneficiary satisfaction carried out by an independent consultant found out that the project led to substantial improvements in the incomes and living conditions of the beneficiaries. However, the ICR did not provide details on the survey methodology nor the sample size. M&E implementation also benefited from using GIS localization of project investments to monitor progress in implementation more closely as well as from field visits and technical advice by the Central Monitoring Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture (ICR, paragraph 49).

Overall, M&E implementation was successful in compiling reliable M&E data that were verified through different sources as discussed above.

The ICR (paragraph 49) reported that the project data especially in the last two years of implementation were used for "decision making and to refine the implementation strategy of the project." The M&E data



environments, and surrounding communities, essentially during construction and/or production. These impacts were expected to be temporary and localized, and proper mitigation measures during construction and/or production could minimize or even eliminate them. The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), the Integrated Pest Management Plan (IPMP), and the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) were prepared, approved, and disclosed in Togo on November 17, 2010 and at the former Infoshop on December 22, 2010.

The ICR (paragraph 53) stated that “the project complied with all applicable environmental and social safeguard policies.”

The ICR (paragraph 51) stated that “the overall environmental safeguards compliance under ASSP was adequate.” Technical and institutional capacity in environmental safeguards benefited from training sessions that were conducted for decentralized technical services. Beneficiary groups also benefited from awareness raising and training activities. According to the ICR (paragraph 52) the “project successfully conducted environmental monitoring of activities in the field, based on established protocols and the systematic application of environmental and social screening for activities supported by the project, and mitigation measures were identified and recommended to the beneficiaries.”

A Resettlement Policy Framework was developed and publicly disclosed. A formal and functioning grievance redress mechanism GRM was established under the project, but with a delay, and complaints received were timely addressed. A study to assess compliance with the safeguard policies during the additional financing indicated that “in general, project activities were implemented according to World Bank standards for environmental and social safeguards (ICR, paragraph 53).”

The project developed a financial management plan to ensure that the project implementation unit (PIU) would have the capacity to implement the project. According to the ICR (paragraph 54) “the project complied with the relevant financial covenants and ensured regular and timely



“There were no significant unintended outcomes or impacts noted resulting from the project (ICR, paragraph 35).”

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Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial

The ICR included three lessons. The following lessons are emphasized with some adaptation of language:

Project implementation by existing government entities fosters ownership, improves capacity building, and lays the foundation for improved institutional capacity beyond the project lifecycle. The ASSP was implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and the capacity built remains within the Ministry so that it can continue providing quality support, capacity building and advisory services to beneficiaries even after project closing. To be effective, the right incentives (better working conditions, training and attractive compensations) are needed to compensate the staff and retain them to prevent a high turnover. The building up of capacities in institutions also needs to be based on a strategic vision and resource commitment for continuous institutional improvements to be viable.

The ASSP was implemented in a context of weak capacity of



government entities in the agricultural sector. External technical assistance was hired to support the



Various parts of the ICR were internally consistent and logically linked and integrated.

. The ICR successfully used the available data to justify the assigned outcome rating. Discussion of outcomes was comprehensive, and the efficiency analysis was robust.

. The ICR provided comprehensive coverage of the implementation experience and candidly reported on shortcomings. There was enough clarity in the report's messaging. The outputs in Annex 1 included the expected end targets and the reporting on safeguards included an explicit statement on compliance with the Bank's safeguard policies. Finally, the ICR could have elaborated more on the risks that materialized during implementation and the adequacy of the mitigation measures. The ICR also lacked an Annex that listed the Bank staff/Consultants who participated in the project.

Overall, the Quality of the ICR is rated Substantial despite some minor shortcomings.